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E-Motion: Being Moved by Fiction and Media? Notes on Fictional Worlds,
Virtual Contacts and the Reality of Emotions1
Katja Mellmann
     Traditionally, it is thought that emotions for objects logically presuppose beliefs in the existence of such objects.
But why then do novels move us, though we know that these people who laugh and cry there are nothing but pure
inventions? In philosophical aesthetics this is called the "paradox of fiction" (cf. Levinson 1997). It seems a paradox if
it is put into the conceptual logic of philosophy, but rather it is just a very complex phenomenon which—as ordinary
and familiar it may seem to our intuition—is unfortunately hard to observe and to describe systematically.  
The "paradox of fiction" within a neurophysiological perspective
     Indeed, neurophysiology has improved much in imaging the brain's activity, but every new experiment can only
readjust preexisting models of the brain's functioning, of cognition and of consciousness. Experiments can only make
more plausible or falsify what we have already hypothesized. What is really going on—which neural processes are
involved with emotions and which with belief in the existence of certain things—is something that nobody knows
exactly, now as before.
     Nevertheless there are reasons to suppose that the mental representation2 of certain occurrences on the one hand
and their cognitive appraisal on the other hand (for instance as "real" or "unreal") are two separate processes in the
brain, which can combine differently each time. If, for example, subject A lifts an arm and another subject B watches,
imaging shows an identical pattern of neuronal activation in one area of both of their brains (cf. Fadiga and Fogassi
1995; Buccino and Binofski 2001). For A this pattern is linked to further neuronal maps that tell him that it is he himself
who moves the arm. For B this pattern is linked to the information that it is A who moves the arm. The same with a
third subject C who sees the action on a movie screen: C activates the same quasi-semantic pattern "lift the arm." CPsyArt: An Online Journal for the Psychological Study of the Arts. http://www.clas.ufl.edu/ipsa/journal/2002_mellmann01.shtml
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also identifies the person who does so, and C is quite aware of the fact of seeing this action on a movie screen.
Similarly, when subjects are shown pictures of their friends, they turn out to activate to some extent the same areas of
their brains as they do in real confrontation with these friends (Kanwisher and O'Craven 2000). Those
experiments—the papers I refer to here pertain to a much more extensive field of exploration, often summarized by G.
Rizzolatti's and V. Gallese's notion of 'mirror neurons' (Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998; Gallese and Goldman
1998)—suggest that the emergence of a mental representation, furnished by a specific neuronal activation pattern, is
a relatively distinct process, and that the awareness of the medium of the sensual representation, like attributions of
the source or personal associations, is a separate additional information.
     But why do our hairs stand on end if a tough guy in a photo or on the screen not only lifts his arm, but shakes a fist
and swears revenge? Why the well known "lump in your throat" if two persons lift their arms to embrace each other for
ever, after all the longing and craving of two hours? We do not only recognize the action, but we also respond to it.
Feelings like these in real life: social dispositions and automatic reflexes
     Film theorists agree today that we respond to the fictional personae on the movie screen with our common
everyday social emotions, with sympathy, pity, horror and fright; at least we do within the visual medium of film.3 We
do not deceive ourselves about the factuality of these persons. We know that these characters are merely fictional,
and this knowledge is always latently there in our brains and can be more or less highlighted, depending on the quality
and intensity of the emotion. From too strong emotions we prefer to liberate ourselves, for instance, by changing to
anger against the director for manipulating us. But our first sentimental response to the fictional characters happens
spontaneously. It obviously comes from an innate psychological mechanism.4 We can mask it somewhat with other
actions, but we cannot avoid it completely. We do feel the impulse to cry after all, whether we really will or not, and
every further action of avoidance builds on this primary affect.
     Isolating aesthetics as an autonomous subject of philosophy in the eighteenth century has misled theorists to the
conventional view that there is something like an exclusively "aesthetic" emotion, a feeling that we only experience
with works of art. But today in the study of arts, another psychological proposition is changing crucially this traditional
view. Though the aesthetic "framing" of the object and the beholder's awareness of that object as a fiction are still
important topics in the analysis of reader response, our basic responses are nothing but those emotional dispositions
that go along with our everyday life. How could they be otherwise?
     To be sure, the feelings evoked by works of art indeed are often so complex that we do not want to name them by
an ordinary word for an emotion. For aesthetic experiences, we do not speak of "pity," but of "sentiment"; not of "fear,"
but of "thrill." Moreover, works of art often contain highly selected stimuli. The traditional situations and artificial
arrangements that our works of art repeat over and over, have proved themselves efficient in the long history of
human culture. They are tailor-made for optimal emotional effect on the emotional apparatus that evolution has given
us. In reality such stimuli would scarcely occur in quite the same way. This is why aesthetically evoked emotions may
seem somewhat "purer" (Heller in press) to us than "real" emotions. In truth (or say, in a biological view), they are
rather alloyed and contaminated—for instance with the information "you need not act."
     Nevertheless, there is a kind of meditative calm that goes along sometimes with our contemplation of a work of art.
Kant called it the "disinterested delight." But it is not a distinct, or "merely" aesthetic emotion. Kant's aesthetic
"disinterestedness" is an additional cognition, in the neurophysiological sense I suggested above, to the primary
emotional experience. This additional information ensures, for instance, that we control our possible actions toward
the aesthetic object. But it is no sine qua non of aesthetic experience, and it does not make the crucial difference to a
"real" experience. For there are many more situations in life to which we better not react, or not react
immediately—though we instantly simulate such possible reactions in our brains.
     Whether these simulations turn out as a behavioral activation or not is no question of "aesthetic education," as
often supposed (for examples, see Mellmann in press), but of social adequacy. We need not first learn what fiction is,
we only have to be familiar with the social situation we are in during art reception, and we have to know what response
would be adequate in this situation. The factual state of fiction is no such extraordinary thing if regarded from the point
of view of our biological dispositions. I daresay we have a veritable innate "sense" for fiction, just as for hypothetical or
conditional truth (it might be that ...;  he says that ...; if ..., then ...) and other sorts of mental "scope syntax" (see Tooby
and Cosmides 1994/95 and Eibl in press). Our behavioral responses rather depend on social facts like age and
gender, on if we are alone, or with whom we are, and on whether we are familiar with the medium. To give some
examples: Whereas a five year old child still tends to yell "Look behind you! Look behind you!," when the crocodile
appears in the puppet theatre, or tries to save the puppet with its own hands, no grown-up would offer a cigarette to a
movie hero after some stressful episode. But in certain situations even adults may show sort of a "Look behind
you!"-behavior. For example, fans of "cult films" are more lively in their responses than ordinary cinema audiences.
When I watched The Lord of the Rings, the audience applauded long and loud when Aragorn, after a nearly endless
fight, finally cut off the head of the giant ork. Generally, a woman is more free to cry in the cinema, whereas her
husband would be more likely to say to her, "It's only a movie." In the first period of movies, we know that the audience
shrieked with fear and ran before a train hurtling out of the screen towards them. Similarly, people in the eighteenth
century who were listening for the first time to a crescendo in music raised up in their seats, and with the diminuendo
they stopped breathing for a while.
     Artists today play with this gradual transition between awareness of fiction on the one hand and emotions leading
to these spontaneous dispositions to act on the other hand. There is an ambitious competition especially among the
popular arts to achieve ever new illusions of reality and thus to meet audiences where they are most receptive, in thePsyArt: An Online Journal for the Psychological Study of the Arts. http://www.clas.ufl.edu/ipsa/journal/2002_mellmann01.shtml
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heart of their real lives, in their spontaneous emotional reactions. Fear before a suddenly looming danger shows with
particular clarity how such "illusions of reality" work. Even those first cinema audiences should not have been in any
doubt whether they were actually in danger—The automatic behavioral response simply was faster! faster than all the
cognitive processes that went along with it. Thus, the strongest "reality effects" in cinema occur when they affect our
automatic reflex system. The signal from the sensual stimulus then goes directly to the brainstem and is, so to speak,
immediately fired into the motoric system as a neurochemical command. We jerk, ready to lift the arm in a gesture of
defense, to close our eyes, to cringe, or to protect our heads. Sometimes, a sudden loud sound or a quick film cut can
be enough to rouse such fearful reactions.
     Our specific emotional responses are relatively quick, too. The impulse to laugh or to cry is often hard to repress.
The dense succession of jokes or embarrassing behavior in a sitcom stimulates giggling (cf. Eitzen 1999), and we
choke up at the self-sacrifice of a hero (cf. Tan and Frijda 1999). This is presumably due to the facial display function
of laughing and crying. Those important social functions are deeply anchored in our genetic program by biological
evolution. They even work through simple "contagion":  If the persons on stage laugh with humor, we participate
involuntarily, as we laugh when stepping into a room where someone has just made a joke, though we have not been
there to listen to it. Comparably, if one child in a little children's group starts crying, all others start crying, too. Adults,
seeing a weeping face on the screen that shows serious grief and despair, when they are not able to help the woman,
but must sit and wait through the scene as it is, feel the same impulse to just cry and weep with her, regardless of her
reasons. We cannot avoid by consciousness alone the power of our limbic system, the principal domain of our
emotional responses. We can only stand up and leave—if we decide for instance that this film is much too cheap for
our taste—, turn off the television and no longer expose ourselves to the stimulus.
     Besides, sentimental emotion has not always been regarded as trivial affect. The notion of sentimentality today has
a pejorative smack.  But in the eighteenth century the emotion of "sentiment"—famously promoted in Germany by
Lessing—became, as "pity," the most valued of emotions in the theatre. Paradigmatically, a contemporary play by C.
F. Gellert, Die zärtlichen Schwestern (The tender-hearted sisters, 1747), ends with the simplest, but most significant
last sentence. The unfortunate heroine says: "Bedauern Sie mich."  ("Pity me.")
Illusion-weaving: reflexive emotions, identification processes, and friendship with the virtual
     In that so-called "age of sensibility," another kind of emotional influence on the reader developed, this time mainly
in the domain of narrative literature. Writers created a new poetic eloquence for rendering subjective states. This new
style affected not only the reader's social dispositions, but also the reflexive emotions.5 It arose in the sentimental
novels by Richardson and proved a great success all over Europe. The many transported readers of, for instance,
Goethe's Die Leiden des jungen Werthers (The Sorrows of Young Werther, 1774) did not simply feel pity for the hero,
and they did not cry just because he was crying. They were overwhelmed by a sense of really understanding him and
his problems. This is often phrased, they "identified" themselves with him.
     Identification here should not mean, though, that they thought themselves to be Werther, or that they strived to be
like Werther—that is how some mocking or worried contemporaries regarded the case—but that they could, in the
fullest sense of the phrase, feel with him. They could feel his despair and his desires as if they were their own.
Identification thus means active empathy. A new literary genre brought about this possibility: the epistolary novel, in
which the characters told what was happening to them and how they felt. The writer thus could guide the higher
cognitive mechanisms (including values, ideas of a better world, etc.) in a particular way. Now, not only the limbic
system (i.e. our immediate emotional responses) was affected, but the work equally determined—to put it a bit
simply—further patterns of neuronal activation on the neocortex, evolutionarily the youngest part of our brain.
Werther's unhappy letters provide complete and detailed information about all the protagonist's experiences, thoughts
and feelings. The reader—if willing to do so6—takes over the world of Werther's; he hypothetically adopts Werther's
goals, plans, and situation (cf. Oatley and Gholamain 1997, 265, 269). Thus, the reader experiences, in an as-if way,
the same emotions that Werther writes of. He lives, for the time of reading, in the same fictional world as Werther, and
he sees this world through Werther's eyes—but it is the reader's own actual experience, involving his own emotional
system, i.e. his own physiological reactions.
     Those character-related effects of identification are not quite the same as simple immersion. Immersion is a
transitory state in art reception, brought about by what I would like to call the "habituating vacuum." Normally, we
remove anything that could disturb our concentration on the aesthetic stimulus. We need not pay attention to the world
around a book or a movie screen. We are still latently aware of our situation, but as long as there do not occur any
changes, we do not consciously process any information about the surrounding world. This effect is cut off
immediately, though, if we hear a key in the lock of our door while we are reading, or if within a cinema audience
someone suddenly cries "Fire!" (The usual word "absorption" therefore is a bit misleading. It tells only half the truth: It
is not the aesthetic stimulus that "absorbs" us from our response to the rest of the world, but it is the lack of relevant
stimuli in an artificially provided habituating environment. What is true about the idea of absorption is that our
subliminal (i.e. pre-conscious) selection of stimulus recognition works more strictly as long as we are involved with
fiction. That is why, during the act of reading, we may not hear a dog barking outside on the road; or maybe we hear it,
but we do not listen to it.) Identification instead is not based on the habituating vacuum alone, and it is less transitory.
Though character identification may occur together with strong immersion, it initiates a sort of acquaintance, or even
friendship, with the respective character (Mellmann in press). We do not forget that he is merely fictional, but we then
know him, as we would know a real person (see also Benzon 2000). That is, we will keep him in mind for some time,
also while we are doing other things in our lives than reading. We can think of him while doing the dishes, imagine
other situations with him than the book has told us, or even long for his company.PsyArt: An Online Journal for the Psychological Study of the Arts. http://www.clas.ufl.edu/ipsa/journal/2002_mellmann01.shtml
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     Often we identify the main character with the whole of the book (cf. Mellmann in press); then we may yearn for the
feeling we derived from the reading, regardless of whether we mean the person or the book. Much as we yearn for a
beloved person, it could be for the person or for our first meeting that person. We simply yearn for the exceptional
emotional experience (cf. Heller in press). Vice versa, a work of art can grow to a quasi-personal status in our mind,
sometimes embodied by the author. Those mental occupations could be explained by what biologists call the "theory
of mind." To have a "theory of mind" means that we are able to identify another conscious being as such and take into
account an alter ego's motives. This faculty is not found in human beings alone, some apes show it, too. What is
special about human theory of mind is that we have language to produce artificially what I would suggest to call
psycho-genetic effects. In the case of loving an author for the feeling we derived from his poems or novels, we infer an
intentional entity, a person, that is "shining through" the text. In the case of characters in novels we respond to what
might be called mere dummies of mindful beings. We spontaneously assume a human psyche, where definitely there
is none—a fact which every lecturer giving introductions to first-year students in literary studies can tell stories of.  
Historical development: externalization of emotional potentiality
     Appeal through empathy or identification did not come off better in the development of literary history than
sentiment. Both models, if over-done in a modern work of art, we regard as "Kitsch." When we see through how it is
done—unavoidable if such innovations have grown common—the plain enjoyment of one's own emotional
involvement fails. Instead, we feel manipulated, even taken advantage of. Literary history since the eighteenth century
(for instance, in German literature) shows an increase of devices that avoid or only play with the possibility of
sentimental affection and identification. For example, Kafka's works inhibit sentimental responses. His protagonists
are shown from outside, not introducing themselves by their own "merely human" thoughts and feelings as Werther
did, and they never reach their aims or bring any action to its happy or tragic ending. As a result, the reader's feelings
are given no clear temporal structure in which to take effect.7 Abstraction serves the same purpose for the movements
of Symbolism and Surrealism. There we often meet no realistic characters, or no human beings at all, for whom we
could feel pity or empathy. The novels of Mann and Musil put an ironic narrator and his commentary between the
reader and the fictional characters. More and more the emotional organization is left to the reader alone. The text
gives only hints, clues, incomplete or ambiguous suggestions that the reader has to associate, complete and fill with
his own ideas, inferences, and remembered experiences.
     The rage for "truth" in the works of naturalism, and the notorious "O Mensch!"-pathos (the "O mankind!") of
expressionism are but isolated outbreaks as ever new generations of writers take their places within the cultural
patrimony, and rediscover the aim of moving audiences through language. Indeed, even in these examples the play
with alienation and mere suggestion goes beyond the immediate plea for identification one finds in Goethe's Werther.
But it is just this will to play within the art of alienation which may legitimate, or in some sense excuse, an emotional
outburst as an aesthetic exception. And writers have another—rather different—way to legitimate an emphasis on
emotions in the age of modernism. They can refer to social and political issues external to the literary work. This is the
way taken by the generation of the revolutions of 1848. The revolutionaries of 1968 also referred to political matters in
their literary works. These emotions, those evoked by politically engaged works of art, do not arise so much from the
fictional events as from the real ones behind them. As another example, the well known "Verfremdungseffekt"
("alienation-effect") of Brechtian dramaturgy repeatedly unsettles any illusion. The audience is always to be reminded
of reality.
     A by-product of the historical development is the fact that modern works of art are much more intertwined with the
more general vocabulary of their period. The less our limbic system gets to do, the more we depend on being
well-informed about contemporary symbols, cultural allusion, and social significances external to the text. As a result,
modern art tends to become partially "obscure," because styles and fashions change quickly. The codes disappear
from our consciousness, the works rapidly grow out of date. People nowadays may find abstract art boring, or the
emphases of politically "engaged" literature laughable. Ennui comes from the historical decline of the
"Allgemeinmenschliches" (the "generally human"—for Goethe and his contemporaries, this was an important term in
their aesthetics). The symbolisms and social problems of modern works of art fade. By contrast, the novel Werther will
never—at least for the foreseeable future—become obscure. We may regard it—in Goethe's times as well as in
ours—as too passionate, or disapprove of it as a too excessively emotional articulation, but we will always understand
at least the story of loneliness, disappointed hopes, unspecific yearning and unhappy love.
     Indeed, that said, we do not today respond less emotionally to art than people did two hundred years ago. The
primary methods of arousing the reader's emotions persist unchanged in the popular arts, for instance, in detective
novels, thrillers, and romances. And also in "serious" literature, something new has arisen.
Reader response mediated by culture and individual biography
     What today we conventionally consider "aesthetic emotions" is the worship of a very well made, i.e. a "sublime" or
"genial" work of art. Again, I would not assume a distinct, purely "aesthetic" emotion as source. The feeling of worship
for a work of art, in my opinion, is the consequence of an innate social disposition: admiration. We feel admiration (and
sometimes love) for the artist because of originality and artistic skills. The experience of the "sublime" is due to a
cognitive shift (Freeland 1999, 73) within the reader's or beholder's consciousness while reading/beholding. He
switches from emotions concerning the fictional world (so-called F emotions; see Tan 1996, 65, 82) to emotions
concerning the work of art as an artefact (so-called A emotions). This experience is not so different from a religious
one, say if we look on the nature around us and realize "how very well it is all done." Hence, this kind of experience
involves cognitive processes: additional thoughts, conceptions (like "God" or "Nature"), values, and anything which in
cognitive theory of emotion is called "attributions" or "inferences." These conceptions, values, etc., depend on our
culture and socialization. If we call a work of art "sublime" or "genial" for its linguistic quality, for instance, we do soPsyArt: An Online Journal for the Psychological Study of the Arts. http://www.clas.ufl.edu/ipsa/journal/2002_mellmann01.shtml
5 von 10 08.09.2006 12:30
mainly because of the Western tradition of "genius" as it is understood since the late eighteenth century, and because
of our education with canonical literary works. Our literary socialization provides criteria for aesthetic evaluation that
determine our cognitive as well as our emotional response. We appreciate the extreme perspectives an author may
take, we value linguistic inventions and detailed descriptions, and we like being tricked by an author's cunning. We are
using the emotional principle of admiratio—as old as Aristotle. Admiration that was, in antique times and still in the
martyr plays of the seventeenth century, directed to the hero, i.e. to an element of the fictional world—today focuses
on the virtual contact between author and the reader. The mechanisms of our innate emotional repertoire are the
same, only the object has changed.
     In addition to the domain of culturally mediated emotional cues like the conception of "genius," there are symbols
and personal meanings. The feelings some Americans derive from the Stars and Stripes, or some people have while
beholding Picasso's dove of peace, or with which lovers may listen to "our song," are very complexly structured
emotions, composed of a variety of individual memories and cultural conditionings (cf. Aiken 1998, 15-18). It is hard to
describe them objectively. They nevertheless contain something very concrete, for example, emotionally intense
situations of the reader's past, or ideals and values that are of great importance to him in his life.
     The intellectual and ideological reservations that modulate our emotional behavior are also highly individual. A
pacifist may be irritated by a military march. Someone else might find the easy emotionality of popular music
manipulative or even molesting. You will not approve of the Pleasantville if you have come to think that "the world is
bad" and that all agreeable forms of art are nothing but "opiates for the masses." So too a sexist or xenophobic joke
will be "not funny" (even if it is).
     But there are some basic affective processes in the reception of art that are not determined by cultural influence
and historical changes. They not only show another overlap of real life and aesthetic experience, but also determine
our behavior in other pastimes and leisure entertainments, for instance, playing games or surfing on the internet.  
Basic affective processes in media interaction: pleasure and suspense (tension) 
What Kant has called the agreeable and the beautiful constitutes—to put it in the terminology of modern
psychology—the domain of pleasure.8  This is the odd and comfortable feeling that keeps children playing on and on,
without termination. And even grown-ups can build sand castles and play many rounds of Tetris without getting tired of
it. Karl and Charlotte Bühler tried to make this comfortable feeling precise as "function pleasure" (Bühler 1927,
179-212; cf. Frijda 2000). They suggested that people enjoy the mere, uninhibited functioning of their cognitive and
physical apparatus. Thus we enjoy dancing or solving crosswords. The activity giving pleasure is—in Kant's
sense—"without purpose" (one cannot inhabit a sand castle), although it seems "purposive" at the same time. We are
not able to say exactly where this impression of "purposiveness" comes from, but a recent branch of psychology,
evolutionary psychology,9 has made plausible suggestions during the last two or three decades.
     Consider that we have a kind of innate preferences for certain objects. The idea of, for instance, the locus amoenus
(the "amiable place" of the bucolic tradition) as a simply beautiful and comfortable place we can understand as
inherited from the environmental conditions of our Pleistocene hunter and gatherer ancestors. Their—by no means
irrational—preferences for certain landscapes for habitat (greenness, canopies, water, the presence of edible
mammals or mammals providing edible products, semi-open space, etc.; cf. Orians and Heerwagen 1992) over the
long period of time, in which the genome of the human species has evolved, is crucial for what we today consider as
simply "beautiful" or "pleasant," without a conscious reason or special preconditioning.
     This evolutionary explanation does not imply any sort of Lamarckism. The basic postulate for any evolutionary (or
sociobiological) explanation of hedonic phenomena is that the arbitrary combination of an object with the sensation of
pleasure in an individual by random genetic mutation will have an increased reproductive payoff if the object, or the
correlated behavior towards it, contributes positively to survival and reproductive success. As a result, this arbitrary
combination will be reproduced in the next generation of individuals, and thus can grow common within a whole
species, simply by an evolutionary selection process. "This is why sugar is sweet and sexual activity is fun," as Orians
and Heerwagen (1992, 555) put it: "Those of our ancestors who found consuming carbohydrates and engaging in
intercourse enjoyable left more surviving descendants than those individuals who were not motivated in those
behaviors." Thus, animals seem to have sort of an intrinsic "reward system" which comforts us each time we do
something "good for evolution." But to be exact, this means "good for the reproduction of our genes," yet not
necessarily "good for us." Things that may have had an adaptive value in EEA (the "environment of evolutionary
adaptedness"; cf. Tooby and Cosmides 1990, 386) can be neutral or even detrimental in a modern civilization;
and—equally important!—any action that elicits pleasure and is "good for us" today must not have been "good" in EEA
for the same reasons that it is today.10 The so-called "ultimate cause" for pleasure is definitely not conscious (and,
strictly speaking, not "unconscious" either).
     Likewise, the fact that we like to see beautiful bodies in cinema (male as well as female, regardless of the
beholder's sex), or that we follow fashion shows with interest may be because of our disposition for mating behavior.
We feel attracted by the beautiful figures, and by this we experience a smooth pleasure by acting out our biologically
inherited responsiveness to them.11 I want to stress that this pleasure still is a form of "function pleasure" as
suggested above; it is—even in the case of mating behavior as responding disposition—not an erotic pleasure. One
may experience the latter as well, certainly, but this is not what I mean here. One does not necessarily think of sexual
attraction or a possible mating partner while beholding beautiful people, but simply of something pleasant;  but this is,
in a Darwinian perspective, because of their principal potentiality as mating partners (for anyone, not necessarily for a
particular person).PsyArt: An Online Journal for the Psychological Study of the Arts. http://www.clas.ufl.edu/ipsa/journal/2002_mellmann01.shtml
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     Moreover, there a several cognitive rules—as I may sum them up—that are deeply anchored in the human mind.
For instance, we enjoy recognizing certain structures—for instance, the simple idea that a story should have a
beginning, a middle, and a formally substantiated ending. To enjoy those structures also means to find them
"beautiful." Turner and Pöppel (1988, 75) therefore speak of the "kalogenetic" functioning of the brain. Another such
rule is our predisposition to recognize repetitions (cf. Zajonc 1968; 1980). The simple pleasure we enjoy at the
recurrence of a group of sounds (rhyme), of a rhythmic pattern (poetic meter),12 or a poetic image (isotopics; cf.
Greimas 1966) is something no one would care to give up in reading poems. In fairy-tales the crucial episodes are
often told three times the same, nearly literally. The pleasure we derive from the formal organization of literature is
presumable due to the "function pleasure" we get from enacting our innate cognitive abilities. One might therefore also
speak of "cognition pleasure" (Eibl in press). Pleasure-giving formal arrangements "tie up" the meaningful content in
order to make it "over-coherent," and, as such, transportable (Eibl 1993, 25-26; 1995, 22-23). If we economize too
much with such arrangements (as for instance in experimental art), the work of art risks losing its spontaneous
attraction and loses the wider audience.
     Pleasure, by the way, is no distinct emotion in the basic sense of the word; it is sort of affective "comment" on the
separate transient sensations and emotions we experience (Wilhelm Wundt; cf. Frijda 2000, 73). It consists merely in
the unconscious impulse to go on, to read further, to not stop. That is how we arrive at a seemingly paradoxical
combination: Even if you lose a round of Uno, you might still want to play again. We "enjoy" even a dreadful horror
film. To be unhappily in love may still feel good somehow. It is this impulse to continue which also leads to the
phenomenon of "addiction" so often observed in history. Eighteenths century moralists railed against the "reading
epidemic" ("Lesefieber") and the "addiction to novels" ("Romanensucht") among youngsters. Twentieth century
moralists do the same with the craze for movies among the young, their dependence on TV, their deep love for the
Walkman, and recently even their "internet addiction." Whether the moralists are right does not lie within my scope
here, but such opinions show how strongly the success of media with our pleasure apparatus may sometimes
influence behavior.
     A phenomenon of origin similar to pleasure is suspense. Why, even in a wholly frivolous, shallow, and intellectually
unsatisfying mystery story, do we like to know who the murderer was (cf. Eibl 1993, 21; 1995, 17)? And how can a
Hitchcock film that we watch for the second time still seem very suspenseful and interesting, even if we have not
forgotten what the final resolution of it all was (cf. Carroll 1996)? Suspense, or tension, is not, despite the longtime
common view, merely a question of knowledge and distribution of information. Rather, it depends on our active
co-experiencing of narrative episodes, therefore often called "tension arcs."
     Psychologists long ago realized that people perceive their life by means of "gestalt."13 That is we divide our lives
into separate episodes with beginnings, middles and endings, and we represent our lives to ourselves as a kind of
emotional sum or essence (the "Prägnanzprinzip" within gestalt theory). There is obviously another innate cognitive
rule involved here. We cannot cognitively digest the chaotic flood of experiences, and thus we constantly form
graspable entities. Cooking for dinner, eating, and making the dishes may be one such entity. Planning, projecting,
and achieving a professional task another one. If we let one such gestalt disturb the other continuously, we would fail
in the common challenges of everyday life.
     Within the arts, this cognitive disposition can be exploited. In works of art we are shown gestalts from which
everything that does not pertain to them directly has been removed. "Blind motives" in a play or film script are
considered as an error, whereas the presentation of "pure" or "ideal" forms elicits delight, that is, the "reward" pleasure
of freely satisfying our disposition for gestalt recognition.
     But you may also play with this disposition. If, for instance, a story begins with an act of injustice, a
misunderstanding, or a menacing peril—examples of a "bad" or imperfect gestalt—the reader will feel uneasy (the
"Zeigarnik-effect" within gestalt theory) until the injustice is repaired or revenged, the misunderstanding is cleared up,
and the peril either is removed or has come true. This is the way tension is provoked. Tension, like pleasure, is not a
distinct emotion, but it affords the division of our emotional experience into distinct units, into separate "emotion
episodes" (Frijda 1993), or, within fiction, into sequential "tension arcs."
     If the work withholds from the reader the "good" gestalt of an injustice dealt with somehow, the reader may
experience the "tragic." The bewilderment created by a happy ending refused, or by an "open" ending, may last even
long after the experience of that particular work of art. The "tension arc" was not achieved, or "closed," by the work of
art, and its reader or viewer feels the undissolved suspense and restlessness. Another way of dissolving tension
without simply achieving the gestalt norm, is comic. A comic impression can be evoked for instance by an
inadequate—but marked as ironic—final resolution; or by an unexpected turning that makes the reader forget about
the before evoked expectations in a sudden surprise. A once initiated theme is simply given another ending than the
one normally expected; a principle often summarized as "the incongruity-resolution theory of humor."14 Not only
narrative works, but also for instance music may work on the listener by principles of tension: by the restless play of
eliciting auditory expectations and achieving (or hesitating with) the harmonic solution. And even comical effects can
be worked out in music, for instance by a sudden change of style.
     These basic affective processes of art reception also influence our behavior in front of the TV or in using the
internet. Passionate channel surfers skip only after recognizing what they perceive as a specific genre. As long as
they do not grasp it, they are held by their own uncertainty in front of the mysterious and cannot act unless they know
if it is a film, news, quiz, talk-show, or commercial—and if the last, for what product. Surfers on the World Wide Web
show a comparable behavior. The current homepage must quickly be put in its place within a pre-existent schema
("interesting/not interesting," "informative/not informative," "serious/frivolous," etc.). If this is not possible, we arePsyArt: An Online Journal for the Psychological Study of the Arts. http://www.clas.ufl.edu/ipsa/journal/2002_mellmann01.shtml
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tensed, and we keep on. But, if we succeed in recognizing the genre, information value, and so on, we experience
satisfaction. This sort of satisfaction I mean here is independent from the substantial content of the page we found.
Sometimes we consider a website as interesting, informative and serious—and then move on to the next instead of
reading it. If we search the internet "just for fun" (not for work, for then we should read), the mere process of
searching, and hoping to find something, can itself be the sole object of satisfaction, or—in the sense of the
psychological term—of pleasure. Because we still perform in these actions an innate cognitive disposition.
Conclusion
     The examples of a variety of emotional involvement with "unreal" ("fictional" or "virtual") worlds given in this essay
should illustrate why our emotional responsiveness is not strictly tied to our conviction that these occurrences are of
any pragmatic relevance to us. Works of art, games and other leisure entertainments do move us as thoughts can, as
old memories may annoy us or fill us with shame; as dreams sometimes can agonize us even after we get up. The
content of such experiences may refer to unreal scenarios or situations that are not ours, yet the feeling we have is
empirically real.
  Notes:
1  The original German version of this essay in Parapluie, a non-scholarly online journal, was meant to give a short 
and readable survey on a subject not yet much explored within literary studies. I tried to be not too specific in my 
arguments and examples, writing for a general audience. The examples I give are not meant to strictly prove, but 
rather to illustrate, what I suggest, by some everyday experiences. Nevertheless this essay was based on some 
scholarly papers; so the translated version, which I was kindly invited to publish in PsyArt, now provides all the 
documentation, and was partly revised and extended, though the principal style of an essay was retained. (Back to 
Main Text)
2  I use this term in the sense of "idea," as proposed for instance by Damasio 1999. (Back to Main Text)
3  Tan (1994) speaks of "witness emotions" in general. For a survey on this subject see the contributions in Plantinga
and Smith 1999 and Tan 1996. I think that many of these already advanced investigations in the domain of film 
studies could be transferred into literary studies, though, as far as I can see, there have not been any comparable 
attempts yet. (Back to Main Text)
4  I use the term "psychological mechanism" as proposed by Buss 1999; it is one of the current suggestions, besides
"program" or "disposition," or "mental module," to replace the older terms of "instinct" and "drive." It implies the 
rediscovery of William James' idea that humans have rather more instincts than other animals, not fewer (cf.
Cosmides and Tooby 1997, Introduction). — The term "innate" in a more technical essay should have been replaced
by "intrinsic" (see the discussion in Tooby and Cosmides 1992, 81), for I do not mean "present from birth," but "within
our genetic program," regardless when exactly the mechanism will be "unpacked" and put into function
ontogenetically. (Back to Main Text)
5  Some authors (for instance Damasio 1999) distinguish "emotion" (the objective, not necessarily conscious
physiological process) from "feeling" (the conscious subjective experience of an emotion). I will not strictly follow this 
distinction, for both words tend to be used synonymic in colloquial language. (Back to Main Text)
6  I should add that I do not adhere to the idea of our "willing suspension of disbelief" (for a survey on the major
resolutions of the "paradox of fiction," see Levinson 1997, 23). Though it may be a good model for describing the
so-called "paradox of fiction," it implies—by saying that a suspension of disbelief is necessary for emotion—the
proposition that emotion depends on belief, that is, on a cognitive proposition. Indeed, what I strive to show is that we
respond to the thing itself, regardless of its factual status; and that we may modify our response intellectually in
proportion mainly to its quality, less in proportion to its factuality. If the readers of Werther are willing to merge within 
Werther's experiences, they do not do so for reasons of belief, but for reasons of sympathy. They are not willing to 
believe in spite of fiction, but to co-experience because of sympathy. (Back to Main Text)
7  Tan and Frijda (1999, 54) suggest "any major resolution in a conflict" involving deep human needs (like attachment,
surviving, birth and death, etc.), if good or bad, to be the principal trigger for the sentiment response (response to the
overwhelming), which they very plausibly interpret as an innately biased response to situations of helplessness. — As
an example of the inhibition of sentiment within the work of Kafka, see his short text "Heimkehr" (Homecoming), a kind 
of adaptation of the biblical story of the Prodigal Son. The "separation and reunion theme" by Tan and Frijda (1999, 
56-58) is thought to be one of the main themes for a sentimental response. Kafka's protagonist, though, never steps 
into the house of his father, but ends up with bashful and reluctant thoughts in a subjunctive mood. Nevertheless, the 
story would not work if the reader did not somehow expect the act of homecoming to be finally achieved. This is what 
above I called "only playing with" the emotional potentiality. (Back to Main Text)
8  For an excellent survey on this subject see Frijda 2000. In general, I would like to warmly recommend Frijda's book
on "The Emotions" (1986); it would be of great help to those (non-psychologist) readers who are looking for a 
synthesizing, yet carefully informed introduction into the study of emotion and find themselves desperately confronted 
to the enormous multitude of issues by physiologists, behaviorists, cognitivists, evolutionists, constructivists, etc. To 
study those further questions, the multiple contributions in Ekman and Davidson (1994) might be a good start. (Back 
to Main Text)
9  One may read for introduction the little primer by Cosmides and Tooby (1997), Buss' book (1999) and thePsyArt: An Online Journal for the Psychological Study of the Arts. http://www.clas.ufl.edu/ipsa/journal/2002_mellmann01.shtml
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fundamental manifest by Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby (1992). For daily information and further discussions one may 
join the newsgroup moderated by Ian Pitchford at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/evolutionary-psychology/. (Back to 
Main Text)
10  Most of the contributions in Cooke and Turner (1999) ignore these considerations (for an exception, see Ellen
Dissanayake's contribution on music, 367-397). For a fundamental discussion on the problem of adaptation and 
maladaptation now and then, as brought about by different usages of these terms, see Tooby and Cosmides 1990. 
For further examples of presumably innate preferences see Thornhill 1998, Aiken 1998, and Dissanayake 1992. (Back 
to Main Text)
11  Frijda (2000, 86), discussing the evolutionary explanation of pleasure, has asked: "Do people feel attracted
because they like the appearance, or [rather] do they like the appearance because they are attracted?" Frijda opts for 
"function pleasure" in objection to "innate preferences." Both should be the same though, if you consider the 
evolutionary explanation given above. For the systematic locus of "function pleasure" as in play and fiction within 
Darwinian logic see Tooby and Cosmides (1994/95). They suppose an hedonic "organizational mode" in acting out our 
innate dispositions, a kind of "decoupling" to aid aims of ontogenetic development of innate faculties and of the 
self-calibrating of the brain. (Back to Main Text)
12  The topic of rhythm seen from a cognitivist perspective was thoroughly investigated by Tsur (1998). (Back to Main 
Text)
13  The gestalt notion has become a bit archaic. Moreover, it has always been rather imprecise and thus been 
misused. For our purposes, it may be good enough. For more precise investigation, one could probably adopt the 
more differentiated notions of concept, schema, script, and frame, as used within the cognitive sciences and 
sociology. Another way that may lead further, may be the theory of "erotetic narration" by Carroll (1988), or the 
narration-as-problem-solving-theory by Bordwell (1985); cf. Eitzen 1999, 86-88. (Back to Main Text)
14  For a telling discussion on the three main theories of humor within psychology—the incongruity-resolution theory,
the tension-relief theory, and the superiority theory—see Eitzen 1999, 93-99. I completely agree with Eitzen's finding
that we laugh in situations of social stress (as, similarly, with embarrassment), as long as the stressful concerns
involved in this situation are not of vital importance for us at the moment. In his conclusion though, Eitzen returns to
consider our laughing at some sort of verbal wit and badinage humor as "mainly an aesthetic response" (1999, 99),
which, in my opinion, does not exist. I would suggest that we regard all verbal jokes, like all suspension-relief humor,
as another sort of social stress, this time within the virtual author-reader- or artist-recipient-contact, which we should 
consider as well (Eitzen only discusses situations within the fictional world). The author may be playing jokes on the 
reader or purposely giving wrong or misleading information about something, and the reader or spectator has to settle 
hastily all these upsettings of expectation. Here, in my opinion, it is the reader's stress in understanding that triggers 
the humor response. (Back to Main Text)  
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